Autori:
Pistoresi, Barbara ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
,
D'Amato, Marcello ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
Titolo:
Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private informationPeriodico:
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1998 - Fascicolo:
34 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
16In this paper we solve a monetary policy game where a government appoints a completely independent central banker whose preferences from a point of view of private agents are private information. We show that a bit of private information is sufficient to eliminate any incentive for the goverment to precommit monetary policy to a conservative agent: both in a separating equilibrium and in a pooling equilibrium the central banker's optimal degree of conservativeness is the same as the government's one.
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Testo completo:
http://www.iue.it/ECO/WP-Texts/ECO98-34.pdfEsportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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