Autore: Fletcher, Christine
Titolo: Federalism, subsidarity, regionalism and decentralisation principles and practices in european integration
Periodico: International Center for Economics Research, Torino. ICER - Working papers series
Anno: 1999 - Fascicolo: 14 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 18

This paper details the fundamental differences, and also the level of compatibility, between key principles adopted by States to organise sovereignty within the constitutional framework of European integration. The two most significant principles integrated into relationship between governments and people in that framework are federalism and subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is built into various legal instrumentalities to guard against the exploitation of local communities by more powerful governments. Both subsidiarity and federalism are suppose to constrain central power. Broadly, the difference between them is that whereas federalism is a constitutional system of government, subsidiarity is a set of legal patterns for making powerful coalitions of bureaucracies and governments more accountable to local communities. Two other strategic methods that determine the sharing of economic resources and political authority within the European community are regionalism and decentralisation. But, as this paper illustrates, these strategies often cut across local jurisdictions - unlike subsidiarily or federalism, neither regionalism nor decentralisation contain any particular political blueprint for power sharing. Both regionalism and decentralisation are shaped by political or economic objectives rather than by constitutional rules. It is against this background that I address some of the misconceptions that portray federalism as simply a substitute for other forms of political resource sharing, particularly decentralisation. Because of its emphasis on regional self-determination, the terminology of federalism has been fused, misleadingly, with decentralisation and to a lesser extent, with regionalism. Federalism contains constitutional obligations to preserve the self-determination of sub-national governments. The same is not true of decentralisation.


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