Autori:
Krusell, P. ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
,
Kuruscu, B ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
,
Smith, A. ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
Titolo:
Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric DiscountingPeriodico:
Banca d'Italia. Temi di discussioneAnno:
2001 - Volume:
8 - Fascicolo:
413 - Pagina iniziale:
1We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then haracterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his present-value utility subject to resource constraints.The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the iscounting is not geometric.
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Testo completo:
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temidi/td413/Tema_413_01.pdfEsportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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