Autore:
Saglam, Ismail Titolo:
Self-regulation under asymmetric cost informationPeriodico:
Economia e politica industrialeAnno:
2022 - Volume:
49 - Fascicolo:
2 - Pagina iniziale:
335 - Pagina finale:
368In this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of regulation. To this aim, we integrate the self-regulation model of Glazer and McMillan (Q J Econ 107(3):1089–1099, 1992) with the optimal regulatory mechanism devised by Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911–930, 1982) for the case of asymmetric information. Simulating the equilibrium outcome of our integrated model for a wide range of parameter values, we show among many results that the firm threatened with regulation always constrains its price; moreover, the price the firm charges under the threat of regulation can be even lower than the price it has to charge when it is regulated.
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SICI: 0391-2078(2022)49:2<335:SUACI>2.0.ZU;2-5
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