Autore:
Normann, Hans-Theo Titolo:
Stackelberg warfare as an equilibrium choice in a game with reputation effectsPeriodico:
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1994 - Fascicolo:
43 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
31An alternative way of modelling Stackelberg warfare - i.e. a strategic fight for market leadership - is suggested which avoids the inconsistencies of the prevalent disequilibrium interpretation. In a reputation game Stackelberg warfare occurs as an equilibrium choice for two scenarios. In the first scenario a firm challenges its rival by playing Stackelberg leader. The other firm plays warfare to discipline its opponent and to make it return to the Cournot equilibrium. In the second scenario both firms simultaneously play warfare in the initial phase of the game until one of them concedes and accepts to be the follower.
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http://hdl.handle.net/1814/522Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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