Autore: Hinloopen, Jeroen
Titolo: Subsidising cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers
Periodico: European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1994 - Fascicolo: 25 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 19

Allowing firms to collude in R&D can raise the level of R&D investments but weakens authorities’ control over monopoly power. In this paper an alternative (balanced budget) policy, that of subsidising R&D, is analysed. It is shown that subsidising R&D optimally raises social welfare and is more effective in promoting R&D investments than permitting R&D-cartels or RJVs. Also, subsidising non-cooperative R&D or subsidising an R&D-cartel leads to the same market outcomes. Abandoning anti-trust legislation concerning R&D, as is currently being done by the EC authorities, is not supported therefore by the analysis presented here. In stead, authorities should encourage firms to participate in RJVs and subsidise this agreement accordingly.


Premi sulle icone a fianco dei nomi per visualizzare i libri scritti dall'autore

---

---

Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/504

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)