Autori:
Kirman, Alan ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
,
Calsamiglia, Xavier ![](http://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/img/logo-bncf.jpg)
Titolo:
A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomesPeriodico:
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1991 - Fascicolo:
37 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
34In this paper we consider the informational requirements of decentralised resource allocation mechanisms which attain both fair and efficient outcomes in pure exchange classical environments. We show that the only informationally efficient mechanism which will attain such allocations is the equal income Walrasian mechanism, in which all agents take prices as given and maximise utility subject to the average income constraint.
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Testo completo:
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/376Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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