Autore:
Hammond, Peter J. Titolo:
Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisonsPeriodico:
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1990 - Fascicolo:
5 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
30Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social
choice depend only on personal rather than interpersonal comparisons of relevant
social states, and so leads to dictatorship. Instead, a new “independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons” (IIIC) condition allows anonymous Paretian social welfare functionals such as maximin and Sen’s “leximin,” even with an unrestricted preference domain. But when probability mixtures of social states are considered, even IIIC may not allow escape from Arrow’s impossibility theorem for individuals’(ex-ante) expected utilities. Modifying IIIC to permit dependence on interpersonal comparisons of relevant probability mixtures allows Vickrey-Harsanyi utilitarianism.
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