Autore: Revelli, Federico
Titolo: Tax Limits and Local Democracy
Periodico: Università degli studi di Torino. Dip. Di Economia e Statistica Cognetti de Martiis. Working paper series
Anno: 2013 - Volume: 7 - Fascicolo: 36 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 42

Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax imitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the in fluential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore




Testo completo: http://www.est.unito.it/do/home.pl/Download?doc=/allegati/wp2013dip/wp_36_2013.pdf

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)