Titolo: Value allocations in economies with coalition structure
Periodico: Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale 'A. Avogadro' : Facoltà di Economia - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Quantitativi "SEMEQ" - Quaderni
Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 7 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 9

We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures; (b)the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three–player case in an exchange economy.




Testo completo: http://semeq.unipmn.it/files/quaderno%20completo%207%20centrone.pdf

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)