Autori: Motta, Massimo, Polo, Michele
Titolo: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
Periodico: European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1999 - Fascicolo: 23 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 36

We study the enforcement of eompetition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing infor-mation to thè Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also bave a prò-collusive effect, since they de-crease thè expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze thè optimal policy under alternative rules and with homogeneous and heterogeneous cartels, obtaining a ranking of the different schemes and showing when thè use of reduced fines may improve antitrust enforcement.




Testo completo: http://www.iue.it/ECO/WP-Texts/ECO99-23.pdf

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