Autore: Devetag, Maria Giovanna
Titolo: Precedent Transfer in Coordination Games : Experimental Evidence.
Periodico: Università degli studi di Trento. CEEL - Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory. Working papers
Anno: 2002 - Fascicolo: 7 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 34

In this work we study the power of precedent transfer in improving coordination in the minimum effort game with large groups. We test whether groups which play a different coordination game in which chances to reach the best equilibrium are higher than in the minimum effort game can then transfer the homegrown precedent of efficiency to the minimum e®ort game, achieving better coordination results compared to baseline treatments. We also test whether the opposite holds, i.e., whether ine±cient precedents achieved by groups in the minimum effort game negatively affect the subsequent probability of reaching the effcient equilibrium in similar games. Our results show that efficient precedents are generally transferred successfully to the minimum effort game, allowing groups to achieve better equilibrium outcomes compared to standard results.




Testo completo: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00000183/

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