Autore: Menicucci, Domenico
Titolo: Optimal two-obiect auctions with synergies
Periodico: International Center for Economics Research, Torino. ICER - Working papers series
Anno: 2001 - Fascicolo: 18 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 29

We design the revenue-maximizing auction for two goods when each buyer has bi-dimensional private information and a superadditive utility function (i.e., a synergy is generated if a buyer wins both goods). In this setting the seller is likely to allocate the goods inefficiently with respect to an environ-ment with no synergies. In particular, if the synergy is large then it may occur that a buyer’s valuations for the goods weakly dominate the valuations of another buyer and the latter one receives the bundle. We link this fact, which contrasts with the results for a setting without synergies, to "non-regular" one-good models.




Testo completo: http://www.icer.it/menu/f_papers.html

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)