Autore:
Lippi, Francesco Titolo:
Median voter preferences, central bank independence and conservatism.Periodico:
Banca d'Italia. Temi di discussioneAnno:
1999 - Volume:
4 - Fascicolo:
351 - Pagina iniziale:
1This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bank relate to
the structure and stability of the median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of the median voter. The results show that a high degree of inflation aversion of monetary policy is not necessarily associated with a high degree of central bank independence. A high degree of inflation aversion of society (i.e. of the median voter) may lead to establish a central bank which is highly inflation averse, without necessarily making it independent. This suggests that the
negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence indices detected by
several empirical studies may reflect a link between inflation and some deep features of
social preferences.
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