Autore: Schrader, Alexander
Titolo: Vertical foreclosure, tax spinning and oil taxation in oligopoly
Periodico: European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1994 - Fascicolo: 19 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 41

This paper examines the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to supply crude oil to an unintegrated downstream rival, using a stylized model based on the Brent market and UK oil taxation. Market analysts claim that crude oil trading by integrated firms is mainly tax-induced (tax spinning), thereby neglecting the effect of strategic interaction that induces vertical foreclosure in game-theoretical models. I show that in a two-stage game where the integrated firm moves first and the second stage is constituted by a Cournot game, the conditions behind vertical supply are more restrictive than the tax spinning hypothesis assumes.




Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/499

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)