Autore:
Kirman, Alan Titolo:
The dynamics of learning in mis-specified modelsPeriodico:
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1991 - Fascicolo:
40 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
28In this paper we study an example in which agents misspecify the game that they are playing. We show that there is a class of self-sustaining equilibria which are perfectly consistent with the agents’ beliefs and which are achieved by O.L.S. learning in a trivial way. We show that only the equilibria found in an earlier paper by one of us can be sustained by O.L.S. learning. Lastly, we show that if we make a continuous time approximation, then all these equilibria are unstable.
Testo completo:
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/379Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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