Autori: Minelli, Enrico, Gottardi, Piero, Bisin, Alberto, Geanakopolos, John, Polemarchakis, Heracles
Titolo: Markets and Contracts
Periodico: European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 2010 - Fascicolo: 29 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 24

Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.





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