Autore: Galbiati, Marco
Titolo: Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games
Periodico: European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 2006 - Fascicolo: 24 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 22

We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used.





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