Autori
Sembenelli, AlessandroNicodano, GiovannaTitolo
Shareholders' voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies. Periodico
CERIS-CNR. Working PaperAnno:
1996 - Fascicolo:
17 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
15According to our pricing framework block transaction premia depend on voting power being transferred through a block relative to voting power enjoyed by the market. Block transaction premia are shown to be correlated with both the block seller's and the block buyer's Shapley-Shubik power indexes in a sample of Italian companies. This is consistent with the notion, first presented by Zwiebel (1995), that private benefits deriving from control of a company are divisible, and that the share of private benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to the probability of being pivotal in a controlling coalition.
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