Autori
Rondi, Laura
Elston, Julie Ann

Titolo
Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms.
Periodico
CERIS-CNR. Working Paper
Anno: 2006 - Fascicolo: 8 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 29

We investigate implications for the cost of capital in a model with agency conflicts between inside and outside shareholders, where the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. Using firm-level data for Italy and Germany we find significant differences in shareholder protection and its implications for the firm’s ownership structure and the cost of capital. Results indicate that concentrated inside ownership increases the cost of capital for Italian firms while having no significant impact on the cost of capital for German firms. Evidence also suggests bank influence in Germany may serve to reduce investor risk for outside shareholders. In contrast, the magnitude of capital stock distortions is found to be quite important in Italy. Overall, slow growth in continental Europe may be more closely linked to institutional differences in shareholder protection between countries rather than inside ownership of firms.



Testo completo: http://www.ceris.cnr.it/ceris/workingpaper/2006/WP_8_06_ELSTON_RONDI.pdf

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)