Autore
Meo, Claudia

Titolo
Asymmetric information, equal treatment and the core.
Periodico
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale 'A. Avogadro' : Facoltà di Economia - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Quantitativi "SEMEQ" - Quaderni
Anno: 2005 - Volume: 05 - Fascicolo: 99 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 20

We analyze a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. Despite the failure of equal treatment is a basic and well-known consequence of asymmetric information and extends to many notions of core, we show that an equal treatment private core allocation exists in every replicated economy. This is done by suitably modifying the classic result by Scarf about the core of n-person balanced games and it suffices to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium allocation.




Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)