Autore
Labory, Sandrine

Titolo
Signalling aspects of managers' incentives
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1997 - Fascicolo: 4 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 38

This paper analyses a signalling model of managers' promotion from divisions to the CEO position, in both cases of a monopoly and a duopoly. Explicit and implicit incentives in the presence of asymmetric information are shown to induce managers to increase effort in order to signal high ability to owners, thereby raising their probability of promotion. Firms' performance in duopoly is shown to depend on their internal organisation, through owners' choice of incentives, in addition to demand and technology conditions.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/613

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