Autori
Pistoresi, Barbara
D'Amato, Marcello

Titolo
Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private information
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1998 - Fascicolo: 34 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 16

In this paper we solve a monetary policy game where a government appoints a completely independent central banker whose preferences from a point of view of private agents are private information. We show that a bit of private information is sufficient to eliminate any incentive for the goverment to precommit monetary policy to a conservative agent: both in a separating equilibrium and in a pooling equilibrium the central banker's optimal degree of conservativeness is the same as the government's one.



Testo completo: http://www.iue.it/ECO/WP-Texts/ECO98-34.pdf

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