Autori
Breton, Albert
Fraschini, Angela

Titolo
Vertical competition in unitary states : the case of Italy
Periodico
International Center for Economics Research, Torino. ICER - Working papers series
Anno: 1999 - Fascicolo: 20 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 28

In the paper we argue and seek to demonstrate that in unitary states – namely states in which all powers are owned by the central government – vertical competition can generate efficient divisions of powers and decentralization equilibrium outcomes that are stable. Equilibrium outcomes that, in other words, do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions of powers by the central authorities whenever competition is deemed by these authorities to produce results that are judged to be unfavorable. Stability is a product of what we call institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it does not possess the formal capacity to bind a successor government to any of its own decisions, can effectively obligate these successor governments to respect some of the decisions it has made. We argue that a number of such institutional commitment devices exist in Italy and that they make possible vertical competition between central and regional governments in regard to the division of powers and, in addition, that they serve to guarantee that decentralization equilibrium outcomes in the Italian Republic are stable.



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