Autori
Morelli, MassimoGhatak, MaitreeshSjostrom, TomasTitolo
Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talentPeriodico
International Center for Economics Research, Torino. ICER - Working papers seriesAnno:
2001 - Fascicolo:
23 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
36We provide a simple model of credit rationing with endogenous occupational chioce. Entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information and to screen borrowers banks ask for collateral. The interplay between the labour market and the credit market leads to multiple equilibria in a natural way. The higher is the wage rate, the lower is the collateral needed to discourage less talented agents from borrowing. This allows a greater number of poor but talented agets to become entrepreneurs, thereby increasing labor demand and justifying the wage increase. We discuss the implications of our model for economic policy which are very different from those suggested by models that focus on the credit market only.
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