Autore
Ottoz, Elisabetta

Titolo
Un modello di diffusione di innovazioni
Periodico
Università degli studi di Torino. Dip. Di Economia e Statistica Cognetti de Martiis. Working paper series
Anno: 1995 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 15

The model describes a game of imperfect information of echnology adoption. The players are a monopolist offering a cost-reducing process innovation and two identical firms who, observing the innovation prices, are to decide when adopt. Whereas previous diffusion models uniquely based on the demand side invariably abtained diffusion equilibria, here the explicit onsideration of the supply side makes the results more definite. When no learning by doing is present perfect equilibrium implies both firms adopting at period one. If otherwise price mark up increases from period two, perfect equilibrium implies sequential adoption. Moreover both firms adopting at period two is never an equilibrium because the monopolist could not get advantage of the learning by doing effect




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