Autori
Krusell, P.
Kuruscu, B
Smith, A.

Titolo
Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting
Periodico
Banca d'Italia. Temi di discussione
Anno: 2001 - Volume: 8 - Fascicolo: 413 - Pagina iniziale: 1

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then haracterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his present-value utility subject to resource constraints.The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the iscounting is not geometric.



Testo completo: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temidi/td413/Tema_413_01.pdf

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