Autore
Sacchi, Elisabetta

Titolo
Aspettualità dell'intenzionalità e prospetticità del mentale: in difesa di un resoconto pluralista
Periodico
Rivista di filosofia
Anno: 2020 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 179 - Pagina finale: 214

The focus of this paper is the aspectuality of intentional mentalstates. The notion of aspectuality is meant to capture an essentialfeature of intentionality, namely, the feature that accounts for thepeculiar way in which what a given mental state is directed at isintended by the subject of the state. Even though there has beenplenty of theories on this subject matter, in my view all such theorieshave failed to capture a crucial feature of the phenomenonunder investigation, namely, the plurality of the ways in which theaspectuality is realized in different intentional states. I claim thatsuch a failure is mainly due to the almost undisputed adoption of afar from obvious assumption (that I label the «uniformity assumption»). According to this assumption, aspectuality has to be takenas a homogeneous and constant feature that does not vary with theway in which a given mental state is entertained. In my paper, Ifocus on the difference between conscious and unconscious statesand claim that the aspectuality of the former involves subjectiveand phenomenal features that make it unreducible to the aspectualityof the latter. While presenting similarities with John Searle’s, myproposal differs from it, since it rejects Searle’s thesis of the indispensabilityof consciousness for aspectuality.



SICI: 0035-6239(2020)2<179:ADEPDM>2.0.ZU;2-5
Testo completo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1413/97570
Testo completo alternativo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1413/97570

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