Autori
Barth, Erling
Ognedal, Tone

Titolo
Tax Evasion in Firms
Periodico
Labour
Anno: 2018 - Volume: 32 - Fascicolo: 1 - Pagina iniziale: 23 - Pagina finale: 44

Tax evasion is low in many countries because third-party reporting makes employees unable to cheat. Why do not employees collude with their employer to evade taxes or evade as self-employed? We explain this puzzle in a model in which employees have both options. A trade-off between large-scale efficient production and tax evasion implies that tax evasion per employee is decreasing in firm size. The model predicts that there is a gap between the individually and the collectively optimal evasion in firms and that this gap is increasing in firm size. Using survey data, we find support for both predictions.



SICI: 1121-7081(2018)32:1<23:TEIF>2.0.ZU;2-A

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