Autori
Bagwell, Kyle
Staiger, Robert W.

Titolo
Delocation and trade agreements in imperfectly competitive markets
Periodico
Research in economics
Anno: 2015 - Volume: 69 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 132 - Pagina finale: 156

We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments featuring firm-delocation effects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the integrated-market monopolistic competition settings where these effects have been identified, we show that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficiency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. Furthermore, and again as in the perfectly competitive benchmark case, we show that the principle of reciprocity is efficiency enhancing, as it serves to “undo” the terms-of-trade driven inefficiency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral trade policies. Our results therefore indicate that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements applies to a broader set of market structures than previously thought.



SICI: 1090-9443(2015)69:2<132:DATAII>2.0.ZU;2-Z
Testo completo: http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1090944315000022/1-s2.0-S1090944315000022-main.pdf?_tid=25ecea72-554f-11e5-ab68-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1441623593_9a0ffc4b39d64d23f7279c73f40c663c

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)

Biblioteche ACNP che possiedono il periodico