Autore
Vallesi, Martina

Titolo
A measure of the sustainable connection between highest remunerations' and economic performance
Periodico
Rivista di studi sulla sostenibilità
Anno: 2013 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 145 - Pagina finale: 159

Focusing on the agency conflict between manager and shareholders and on the definitions of tunneling and propping, we delve into the related party transactions between a group and its management. Firstly, the paper examines actual and previous information to disclose for directors board remunerations (as for IAS, Consob and TUF). Such remunerations are based on a contract with legal and moral managers obligations to the companies of the group they run and to the stakeholder of such companies. For this reason, a balance between their remunerations and their performance is necessary to achieve preserving the interests of all the subjects involved in the companies’ activities and maintaining the continuity of the group. Then, using regressions, we measure, in a sample of listed companies, if there is a significant and sustainable connection between particular remunerations of the highest paid members of the directors board and the economic group performance.



SICI: 2239-1959(2013)2<145:AMOTSC>2.0.ZU;2-S
Testo completo: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50182&Tipo=Articolo PDF

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