Autore
Pavlakos, Georgios

Titolo
Normativity and Reason-Dependence. A Comment on the Nature of Reasons
Periodico
Politica & società
Anno: 2013 - Volume: 6 - Fascicolo: 3 - Pagina iniziale: 449 - Pagina finale: 474

In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features ofpractical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua beingreasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents' capacity to reflect on them asreasons (which he labels 'Reason'). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptionsof normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz's account: on the first of them, reasonsremain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective; the other, takes reasons to be objectivenormative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason).I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependenceand suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective andmotivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of thepaper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified.



SICI: 2240-7901(2013)6:3<449:NARACO>2.0.ZU;2-T
Testo completo: http://www.mulino.it/download/article/10.4476/74761
Testo completo alternativo: http://www.mulino.it/doi/10.4476/74761

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