Autori
Schianchi, Augusto
Mantovi, Andrea

Titolo
Venture capital, R&S e incentivi: un modello analitico
Periodico
L'industria
Anno: 2007 - Volume: 28 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 335 - Pagina finale: 354

R&D has become a key factor in the modern technological competition, in which firms in advanced countries are not in a position to reduce their cost of labour. In this paper we develop a valuation model of R&D projects along two fundamental lines. On the one hand, Real Options theory defines the value of the investment decision; on the other hand, the agency problem, raised by the delegation of the research commitment, is solved along the lines of the Principal-Agent model, with the characterization of the optimal tradeoffs between incentives and profits, and therefore of the optimal contract between the principal and the research team. Such an approach has a general significance in a corporate governance perspective, in particular in high-tech industries such as the pharmaceutical one.



SICI: 0019-7416(2007)28:2<335:VCREIU>2.0.ZU;2-#
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