Autore
Normann, Hans-Theo

Titolo
Endogenous timing in a duopoly model with incomplete information
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1996 - Fascicolo: 20 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 36

Two timing games which endogenize the order of moves in duopoly are applied for a quantity setting model with incomplete information. The first timing game is such that firms have commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. This timing game exhibits multiple equilibria. This is in contrast to previous results in the literature which establish a unique timing equilibrium under restricted assumptions. The second timing game is such that firms announce their timing decision in advance without committing to an action. This timing game reduces the number of equilibria and supports a Cournot equilibrium for a wide range of parameters.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/591

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