Autori
Lofaro, Andrea
Hoernig, Steffen
Phlips, Louis

Titolo
How much to collude without being detected
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1996 - Fascicolo: 30 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 20

This paper gives guidelines to antitrust lawyers in a case of alleged tacit collusion on how to report demand and cost parameters such that a collusive outcome becomes indistinguishable from a Cournot outcome. It discusses both joint profit maximising outcomes and less extreme collusive outcomes. In particular, it shows what degree of collusion can be made indistinguishable when the antitrust authority knows that the true parameters must lie below some upper bounds.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/602

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