Autore
Hinloopen, Jeroen

Titolo
Cooperative R&D versus R&D subsidies: Cournot and Bertrand duopolies
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1995 - Fascicolo: 26 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 43

Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to collude in R&D with that of providing R&D-subsidies (for which firms are taxed in the product market) reveals that in most cases, both under Cournot and Bertrand competition the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that (i) allowing firms to collude in R&D is redundant and (ii) firms should only be encouraged to share their (independent) research outcomes (i.e. form RJVs) and this agreement should be subsidized accordingly. Abandoning antitrust legislation concerning private R&D is therefore not supported by the analysis presented here.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/551

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