Autore
Hammond, Peter J.

Titolo
Aspects of rationalizable behaviour
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1992 - Fascicolo: 89 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 31

Equilibria in games involve common “rational” expectations, which are supposed to be endogenous. Apart from being more plausible, and requiring less common knowledge, rationalizable strategies may be better able than equilibria to capture the essential intuition behind both correlated strategies and forward induction. A version of Pearce’s “cautious” rationalizability allowing correlation between other players’ strategies is, moreover, equivalent to an iterated procedure for removing all strictly, and some weakly dominated strategies. Finally, as the effect of forward induction in subgames helps to show, the usual description of a normal form game may be seriously inadequate, since other considerations may render implausible some otherwise rationalizable strategies.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/440

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