Autore
Kirman, Alan

Titolo
The dynamics of learning in mis-specified models
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1991 - Fascicolo: 40 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 28

In this paper we study an example in which agents misspecify the game that they are playing. We show that there is a class of self-sustaining equilibria which are perfectly consistent with the agents’ beliefs and which are achieved by O.L.S. learning in a trivial way. We show that only the equilibria found in an earlier paper by one of us can be sustained by O.L.S. learning. Lastly, we show that if we make a continuous time approximation, then all these equilibria are unstable.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/379

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