Autore
Martin, Stephen

Titolo
Periodic model changes in oligopoly
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1990 - Fascicolo: 28 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 20

In a single-period quantity-setting duopoly where tlie effect of periodic model changes is to maintain consumer uncertainty about the likelihood that the product will be satisfactory, both firms can earn greater profit by making model changes than by standardizing their products, but a prisoner's dilemma pattern of payoffs makes standardization by both firms the only noncooperative equilibrium. In a repeated version of the same game, persistent model changes may emerge as a noncooperative equilibrium.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/367

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