Autore
Vignolo, Thierry

Titolo
Imitation and Selective Matching In Reputational Games
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 2007 - Fascicolo: 31 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 28

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.




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