Autori
Ruta, Michele
Brou, Daniel

Titolo
Rent Seeking, Market Structure and Growth
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 2007 - Fascicolo: 3 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 26

We construct a model where firms compete in both political and economic markets. In political markets, firms compete for influence over government transfer policy (rents). This activity can be beneficial for the firm, but is purely wasteful from the point of view of society bcause resources are utilized to achieve a redistribution of income. In the economic market, firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation. Market structure plays an important role in this economy because competition drives firms to invest more in innovation resulting in higher growth. Rent-seeking affects economic growth in two important ways. It diverts resources away from innovation and it affects the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former has a negative effect on growth while the latter effect is ambiguous, depending on whether rent seeking induces entry or exit. This market structure effect depends on a combination of political and economic factors that the theory highlights.




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