Autore
Lofaro, Andrea

Titolo
On the efficiency of bertrand and cournot competition with incomplete information
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1996 - Fascicolo: 33 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 16

It is a well established idea that Bertrand competition is more efficient in welfare terms than Cournot competition regardless of the degree of substitutability or complementarity of the commodities produced by the firms. In this paper I show that, introducing incomplete information about rivals' costs of production this conclusion does not always hold: in a homogeneous duopoly, the Bertrand price (aggregate output) is higher (lower) than the Cournot one if both firms have low costs of production and the costs are uniformly distributed.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/605

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