Autore
Brueckner, MatthiasTitolo
Voting on policies in committees: A welfare analysisPeriodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1998 - Fascicolo:
36 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
26This paper considers committees of n players that vote by (weighted) majority on policies that are binding for all members. The voting mechanism is implemented before the players learn their preferred policies. I derive a formula that measures ex-ante welfare and utility of such a committee as a function of the vote allocation. It will be shown that the simple one-player-one-vote rule is welfare maximizing if every player has the same weight in the social welfare function. For the case of different welfare weights numerical examples show that it might be optimal to include player with zero welfare weights in a committee.
Testo completo:
http://www.iue.it/ECO/WP-Texts/ECO98-36.pdfEsportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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