Autori
Reichlin, Pietro
Siconolfi, Paolo

Titolo
Adverse selection of investment projects and the business cycle.
Periodico
Banca d'Italia. Temi di discussione
Anno: 1998 - Volume: 2 - Fascicolo: 326 - Pagina iniziale: 1

In an economy where entrepreneurs with unequal "abilities" face alternative investment projects, which differ in degree of risk and productivity, we analyse the Nash equilibrium contracts arising from a banks-borrowers game in the context of asymmetric information. We show that, for a particular characterization of the game, one can determine the endogenous distribution of projects and the "type" of contracts (pooling or separating) as functions of the amount of loanable funds. We set this game in a general equilibrium aggregative economy with production, populated by overlapping generations of borrowers and lenders and show that for a range of the parameter values equilibria are characterized by persistent endogenous cycles.



Testo completo: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temidi/tema_326_98.pdf

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