Autori
Antelo, Manel
Bru, Lluís

Titolo
Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market
Periodico
Economia e politica industriale
Anno: 2022 - Volume: 49 - Fascicolo: 1 - Pagina iniziale: 95 - Pagina finale: 109

We consider licensing of a non-drastic innovation by a licensor that interacts with a potential licensee in a Stackelberg duopoly, comparing per-unit and ad-valorem royalty two-part contracts and showing why and when each licensing deal should be used. We contribute three findings to the literature. First, ad-valorem royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as leader in the marketplace, but per-unit royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as follower. Second, only innovations that do not hurt consumers are socially beneficial. Third, our model also suggests that both the licensor’s status as a leader or follower in the marketplace and the innovation size determine the incentive to engage in innovative activities.



SICI: 0391-2078(2022)49:1<95:PVARLI>2.0.ZU;2-5

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