Autori
Piacentino, Diego
Minervini, Leo Fulvio

Titolo
The Selection of Regulators, or, the Political Economy of Regulation in Italy
Periodico
L'industria
Anno: 2021 - Fascicolo: 1 - Pagina iniziale: 123 - Pagina finale: 147

The selection of board members of independent agencies is an important instrument inthe hands of governments (executives and parliaments) to influence the behavior and performanceof such agencies (another important one is the setting of rules). However, such selection,as a subject of study, has been largely neglected. Very little is known on the characteristicsof appointed regulators, and on how they compare with the prescriptions of normativetheory as to their desirable characteristics. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap.It looks to a subset of Italian independent agencies, namely the group of Italian independentregulatory agencies charged with the regulation of companies operating in utility industriesshowing monopoly features (energy, water, waste collection and environmental services, communications,transport). It offers, in the first place, by looking at the cvs of the appointedboard members, an empirical overview of the selections which have been made, in the periodsince the establishment of the first independent regulatory agency, in 1996; in the secondplace, it reflects on the characteristics, determinants, and some (normative) implications of theempirical findings.



SICI: 0019-7416(2021)1<123:TSOROT>2.0.ZU;2-V
Testo completo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1430/98709
Testo completo alternativo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1430/98709

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