Autore
Winkler, Bernhard

Titolo
Reputation for EMU: an economic defence of the Maastricht criteria
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1995 - Fascicolo: 18 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 28

This paper presents a two-period model of a monetary policy game with incomplete information in order to analyze reputational incentives in the run-up to European Monetary Union. The Maastricht criteria are characterized as a simple threshold contract that selects countries for EMU membership contingent on their inflation performance. It is suggested that the Maastricht criteria have an important role to play in two ways. They may confer commitment to policy prior to EMU and they may induce preference revelation of policymakers.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/543

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