Autore
Di Gioacchino, DeboraTitolo
The evolution of cooperation: robustness to mistakes and mutationPeriodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papersAnno:
1994 - Fascicolo:
26 - Pagina iniziale:
1 - Pagina finale:
31is well known that repeated games present an embarassing multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. Recently, Binmore and Samuelson (1992) have shown that cooperation is the unique evolutionary stable outcome when a game is played repeatedly by finite automata. This paper considers whether the evolution of cooperation is robust. Two types of perturbations are considered: mistakes by agents and mutation in strategies. Mistakes by agents are described assuming that the game is played by noisy automata. Mutation in strategies is accounted for by formalizing evolution as a ’modified’ replicator dynamics which ensures that, at any point in time, every automaton is adopted by a positive number of players. Computer simulations indicate that, in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation is robust unless mistakes or mutation are very large.
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