Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ottoz Elisabetta
Author-Email: elisabetta.ottoz@unito.it
Author-Name: Cugno Franco 
Author-Email: franco.cugno@unito.it
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Turin
Author-Workplace-Homepage: http://www.est.unito.it/
Title:Different Rules of Legal-Cost Allocation and Patent Hold-Up 
Abstract: We study how different rules of legal-cost allocation impact on negotiated royalties in an environment 
where patent hold-up is possible. The model assumes that the courts routinely grant stays of permanent injunctions
to allow the infringers to redesign their products or deny injunctive reliefs outright. In these scenarios we 
consider the American system, where each party bear s its own costs, the British system, where the loser incurs 
all costs, and the system favoring the defendant, where the defendant pays its own costs if it loses and nothing 
otherwise. Our main conclusions are that when stayed  injunctions are granted the system favoring the defendant 
provides the best results, while under denied injunctions the American system is preferable 
Length: 17 pages
Creation-Date: 2012-10
File-URL: http://www.est.unito.it/do/home.pl/Download?doc=/allegati/wp2012dip/16_wp_ottozcugno.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:201216