Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ottoz Elisabetta
Author-Email: elisabetta.ottoz@unito.it
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Turin
Author-Workplace-Homepage: http://www.est.unito.it/
Title: A monopolist supplier and learning effects in technology adoption
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the consequences of the introdution of supply side and learning efects 
in the process of technological adoption. Explicit consideration of supply side makes endogenous the price path, 
whereas the occurring of learning enables a better understanding of the coordination process. The model describes 
an open-loop two stage dynamic game of imperfect information:the players are a monopolist offering a cost reducing 
process innovation and two identical firms who, observing the innovation prices, are to simultaneously decide when 
to adopt it, in presence of learning by using and spillover. Open-loop equilibrium in symmetric adoption is the 
solution for incremental innovations, whereas for drastic innovations the resulting equilibrium might be one of 
diffusion or simultaneous adoption, both early and late, according to Y, the probability that adopters will choose 
to adopt early. Independently of the particular equilibrium wich will take place, drastic innovations's first 
period prices are always higher than incremental ones.
Length: 27 pages
Creation-Date: 2002-05
File-URL: http://www.est.unito.it/do/home.pl/Download?doc=/allegati/wp2002dip/3_wp_ottoz.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:200203